During the second half of September, Poland had insisted on its territorial claims to Czechoslovakia, which had been rejected by the 1920 Conference of Elections and should be considered with those of Germany. [70] Meanwhile, all German claims on the Polish corridor and much of Prussia, as well as half of Silesia, have been downplayed as the price of Warsaw`s cooperation. The “guarantees” of Germany and Italy will only guarantee Czechoslovakian neutrality if the requirements of Hungary and Poland are met – that is, their guarantee will only be given, if as long as it is, when the division of Czechoslovakia has progressed further. It is to be feared that by then any guarantee, whether German and Italian or British, will have lost any meaning it might have had. I asked Hitler one in the morning, while we were waiting for the cartoonists, if he was going to see me for another conversation…. I had a very friendly and pleasant conversation about Spain (where he also said that he had never had any territorial ambitions), economic relations with S.E. Europe and disarmament. I did not mention colonies, nor did he. At the end, I pulled out the statement I had prepared before, and asked if he was going to sign it. When the interpreter translated the words into German, Hitler said yes, I will certainly sign it. When are we going to do this? I said “now” and we immediately went to the office and put our signatures on the two copies I had brought.” [Citation required] On 22 May, Poland`s ambassador to France, Juliusz Eukasiewicz, told French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that if France preferred Germany to defend Czechoslovakia, “we will not budge.” The city also told Bonnet that Poland would oppose any attempt by Soviet forces to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany.

Daladier told Jakob Surits [ru; de], to the Soviet ambassador to France: “Not only can we not count on Poland`s support, but we also do not believe that Poland will not hit us in the back.” [19] However, the Polish government has indicated on several occasions (in March 1936 and May, June and August 1938) that he was ready to fight Germany if the French decided to help Czechoslovakia: “Beck`s proposal to Bonnet to show his statements to Ambassador Drexel Biddle and to Vansittart`s statement that the Polish Foreign Minister is indeed ready to pursue a radical policy if the Western powers commit a war with Germany. But these proposals and statements did not elicit a reaction from the British and French governments, which seemed to avoid war by calming Germany. [20] The Polish ultimatum [AJP Taylor most likely refers to the note of 27 September, unanswered until 30 September, not the ultimatum of the end of the night of 30 September – see below], BeneĆ© finally decided, in his own words, to abandon any idea of resistance to the Munich comparison. [73] As Hitler`s previous appeasement had shown, France and Britain were anxious to avoid war. The French government did not want to go to Germany and took over the british Conservative government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.